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“I want to make sure that the America we see from
these major highways is a beautiful America.”
President Lyndon B. Johnson,
1
January 1965.
I.

INTRODUCTION

President Johnson’s commitment to highway beautification
has had a lasting impact on the landscape of America. During the
first half of the twentieth century, the road system in America
experienced unprecedented growth. With this expansion came an
explosion of billboards along the country’s highways, affectionately
dubbed by environmentalists as “visual pollution,” “sky trash,”
2
“litter on a stick,” and “the junk mail of the American highway.”
President Johnson took notice of the public’s disgust at the marred
national landscape.
In 1965 he introduced the Highway
Beautification Act, aimed to induce state regulation of billboards
3
along major highways. Instead of a wholesale ban on billboards,
the legislation limits their use to areas zoned for either commercial
4
or industrial activities.
Since the enactment of the Highway
Beautification Act, there are 875,000 fewer signs along controlled
5
highways.
In a recent case, In the Matter of the Denial of Eller Media
Company’s Applications for Outdoor Advertising Device Permits in the City
of Mounds View, a city-owned golf course encountered financial
6
difficulties. The City of Mounds View attempted to increase the
course’s revenue through the sale of billboard space on golf course
7
land adjacent to a major highway. The Minnesota Department of

1. Federal Highway Administration, How the Highway Beautification Act Became
a Law, at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/beauty.htm.
2. Scenic America, Billboards, at http://www.scenic.org/billboardsign/
billboardsign.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, 1028-33 (1965) (codified as amended at
23 U.S.C. § 131 (2000)).
4. See id.
5. Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Laws and Regulations, at
http://www.oaaa.org/government/laws.asp#fhwa.
An
estimated
500,000
billboards exist along major American highways today. Scenic America, Fight
Billboard Blight: Billboards by the Numbers, at http://www.scenic.org/billboardsign/
blightnumbers.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
6. 664 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003) [hereinafter Eller Media].
7. Id. at 4.
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8

Transportation denied the city’s permits on the ground that the
erection of billboards on the golf course violated the Minnesota
9
Outdoor Advertising Control Act. By the time the case reached
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court faced the multi-faceted
issue of whether a municipally owned golf course qualifies as a
“business area” under the Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control
Act, in light of the definition of an “industrial or commercial zone”
10
under the Highway Beautification Act.
This note first examines a brief history of the municipal
development of the comprehensive plan and outdoor advertising
11
control legislation, the federal government’s promulgation of the
12
Highway Beautification Act,
and the Minnesota Outdoor
13
Advertising Control Act. Upon review of the background of the
14
Eller Media case, this note highlights the opinion rendered by the
15
Minnesota Supreme Court. An analysis of the supreme court’s
interpretation in light of the outdoor advertising control acts and
16
regulations follows, including an examination of the policies that
17
underlie the pertinent statutes. This note concludes that based on
the state of the golf course today, the supreme court’s strict
interpretation of the advertising control statutes focused too
18
narrowly on the zoning label instead of the actual land use.
II. HISTORY
As the construction of American highways progressed, cars
allowed the public to navigate the country with ease and the use of
19
billboards skyrocketed. To some, these signs detracted from the
8. The Minnesota Department of Transportation is charged with issuing
permits for billboards along major highways.
9. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 2.
10. Id. at 6.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B-C.
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part IV.A-C.
17. See infra Part IV.D.
18. See infra Part V.
19. The origin of American billboards can be traced to New York, where, in
1835, Jared Bell printed large outdoor posters for a circus. Outdoor Advertising
Association of America, About Outdoor, at http://www.oaaa.org/outdoor/
sales/history.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter About Outdoor]. At first,
roadside signs advertised local establishments and services. Id. The medium
gained popularity in 1900 when a standardized billboard structure was developed.
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20

American landscape.
By the mid-1920s, signs lined America’s
21
highways and public outcry against billboards intensified. In May
of 1923, members of the New York State Federation of Women’s
22
Clubs began a protest-by-letter campaign against billboards. The
23
The women sent
movement gradually spread to other states.
more than 4,000 letters per month to the top four advertisers in the
country, urging the advertisers to confine signs to commercial
24
locations in order to protect America’s scenic beauty.
The
campaign resulted in fourteen national advertisers pledging to
remove their highway billboards upon the expiration of their
25
contracts. The beautification movement took flight.
A. Municipalities Recognize the Need for Zoning Regulation and Demand
Outdoor Advertising Control Legislation
The rapid and unpredictable growth of cities in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created a need for
26
municipalities to control city development. The City of New York
was the first to do so through the enactment of a comprehensive
Id. The standardized billboards were twelve feet high and twenty-five feet long.
PHILLIP TOCKER, Standardized Outdoor Advertising: History, Economics and SelfRegulation, in OUTDOOR ADVERTISING HISTORY AND REGULATION 11, 39 (John W.
Houck ed., 1969). This standardization created a boom in national billboard
campaigns by allowing advertisers like Palmolive, Kellogg, and Coca-Cola to massproduce billboards for the national market. About Outdoor, supra.
20. Scenic America, Fighting Visual Pollution, at http://www.scenic.org/
billboardsign/billboardcontrol.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). Besides scarring
natural beauty along highways, billboards also have other negative effects. Id.
Billboards have been shown to harm the health of Americans by contributing to
commuter stress. Id. A recent Texas A&M University study concluded that
commuters driving on roads blighted by billboards, sprawl, and strip development
had higher blood pressure, heart rate, respiration, and increased eye movements
and facial muscle activity compared to driving on rural roads. Id. Billboards are
also considered safety hazards because they are designed to distract motorists'
attention from the road. Id. Some companies go so far as to remove trees to
increase the visibility of their billboards from the highway. Id. Billboards have a
negative economic impact on the areas in which they are built. A study in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, found that property values rose as much as 255% after
the removal of nearby billboards. Id.
21. Jean Buraet Tompkins, Letter to the Editor, Billboards or Scenery?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1923, at 16.
22. Club Women Rally to Billboard Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1923, at E15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Offensive Outdoor Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1924, at 18.
26. 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1:2 (4th ed.
2004).
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27

zoning plan in 1916. Through the comprehensive plan, the city
created several zoning districts, such as commercial, residential,
28
and industrial, and assigned different types of uses to each zone.
Zoning regulation was necessary for cities to implement their
29
respective comprehensive plans.
Zoning spread rapidly, especially after the Standard State
30
Enabling Act was enacted in 1922. This legislation empowered
municipalities to divide themselves into zones and permitted
31
regulations to vary between the zones.
The Enabling Act
simultaneously restricted the zoning power of municipalities by
requiring that zoning ordinances be enacted in accordance with a
32
comprehensive plan.
Zoning that benefited individual
landowners, thus not in accordance with the comprehensive plan,
33
was labeled “spot zoning.” Spot zoning has been deemed “the
34
very antithesis of planned zoning.”
Municipal regulation of advertising signs was similarly
35
The popular demand for
common during the early 1900s.
billboard regulation was so great that thirty-three states adopted
36
regulatory statutes during the 1920s.
By 1958, every state had
27. Id.
28. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 958 (5th ed. 2002).
29. 1 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 5:2. Zoning is defined as the “legislative
division of . . . a municipality into separate districts with different regulations
within the districts for land use, building size, and the like.”
BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1649 (8th ed. 2004).
30. DUKEMINIER, supra note 28, at 959.
31. Id. at 971.
32. Id. A comprehensive zoning plan is defined as a “general plan to control
and direct the use and development of a large piece of property.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 304 (8th ed. 2004).
33. Spot zoning is described as a zoning change, usually to a small piece of
land, which creates an island within a larger zoned district that is not consistent
with the surrounding uses. State v. City of Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Minn.
1978).
34. Jones v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 108 A.2d 498, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1954) (classifying spot zoning as “improper permission” to use a small
piece of land); see also DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 136-37 (2d ed. 1986), reprinted in
DUKEMINIER, supra note 28, at 1005.
35. 3 YOUNG, supra note 26, § 16:1. Municipalities have no inherent power to
regulate billboards, so such authority must be granted by the state legislature.
Henry W. Proffitt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L. Q. 151, 160
(1931).
36. Proffitt, supra note 35, at 168. California prohibited advertisements on
public property without consent. Id. at 169. North Carolina required that written
consent of the owner of private property must be obtained to place advertisements
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37

outdoor advertising control legislation. At first, the courts did not
38
approve of controlling land use for aesthetic purposes. However,
courts began to uphold sign control regulations based on the
advancement of public health and safety, the preservation of
39
property values, and the promotion of tourism. Today, billboard
regulation based on aesthetic concerns alone is an accepted and
40
legitimate use of police power.
on that property. Id. New York permitted anyone to remove advertisements from
areas along public highways which had been placed there without governmental
permission. Id at 169-70. Vermont required licenses for anyone conducting
outdoor advertising business within the state. Id. at 170. Colorado prohibited the
erection of billboards within 300 feet of intersections or sharp curves if the signs
would interfere with a driver’s view. Id. Arkansas prohibited the erection of
billboards within 100 yards of a state highway unless permission of the State
Highway Commission was granted. Id. at 170-71. Connecticut prohibited
billboards within 300 feet of any state highway having any word used to give
warning to traffic, unless under the authority of Highway Commissioner. Id. at
171.
37. Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification Act of
1965 Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 468-69 (2000).
38. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting
Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905), overruled in part by State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821
(N.J. 1980). “Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence
rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power to take private property without compensation.” Id.
39. 3 PATRICK ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 17.03[2] (Eric
Damian Kelly ed. 1978). In 1917, the United States Supreme Court upheld an
Illinois Supreme Court decision which justified a billboard regulation on the basis
of public health and safety. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,
529-31 (1917). The Illinois court found that deposits behind billboards can breed
disease which may be scattered by the wind, immoral practices occur under cover
provided by billboards, and fires can start from combustible material that gathers
around billboards. Id. at 529; see also St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo. 1911) (holding that billboards are “constant
menaces to the public safety and welfare of the city; they endanger the public
health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals
and all classes of miscreants”).
40. See John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709,
717 (Mass. 1975) (reasoning that a visually satisfying city tends to contribute to the
health of the citizens). The evolution of the change in judicial attitudes can be
divided into three stages: the early period, where aesthetics was not a basis for
zoning; the middle period, where aesthetics could be a basis if other grounds were
present; and the modern period, where aesthetics are acceptable without the need
for other grounds. RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY 286-87 (1996).
The development of the modern attitude toward aesthetics took a major turn in
1954 when Justice Douglas opined that the concept of public welfare encompasses
spiritual, physical, aesthetic, and monetary values. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
31-32 (1954). The just compensation requirement and free speech restrictions are
the most controversial aspects of billboard control regulations, but are beyond the
scope of this article. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514
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B. The Federal Government, Billboard Control, and the Bonus Act
By the mid-1950s, the federal government felt that its
leadership was necessary to control outdoor advertising along
highways due to the varied scope and effectiveness of the state
41
regulations.
Lawmakers were concerned that uncontrolled
advertising along the Interstate System would decrease highway
efficiency, impair highway safety, and hinder the enjoyment of
42
drivers.
The federal government justified its involvement in
billboard regulation along the Interstate System because it
43
provided ninety percent of the System’s construction funds.
After two failed attempts, the federal government finally made
real accomplishments in outdoor advertising control with the
44
adoption of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958.
This Act
prohibited outdoor advertising within 660 feet of the Interstate
System, but allowed for specific advertising in a narrow set of
45
categories. The Act earned its nickname, the Bonus Act, from a
(1981) (holding that the city must allow noncommercial billboards in commercial
and industrial zones because it cannot distinguish between contents of
noncommercial speech); Eller Media Co. v. Montgomery County, 795 A.2d 728,
739 (Md. App. 2002) (holding that fair compensation must be paid for the
removal of billboards despite a reasonable amortization period).
41. S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2385.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2386. The Interstate System was proposed by President Franklin
Roosevelt in 1944. Albert, supra note 37, at 481. States were not permitted to add
exits and entrances to the Interstate System without federal consent, and the
number of Interstate miles was limited. Id. at 474.
44. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89 (1958).
The first federal level movement in billboard control was led by Senator Richard
L. Neuberger (D-Ore.), who wrote an amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1955 that would enable the Secretary of Commerce to acquire exclusive
advertising rights on land adjoining the Interstate System in certain states. Clifton
W. Enfield, Federal Highway Beautification: Outdoor Advertising Control, Legislation and
Regulation, in OUTDOOR ADVERTISING HISTORY AND REGULATION 149, 150 (John W.
Houck ed., 1969). This provision was eventually deleted from the bill. Id. at 151.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 did not contain any billboard control
provisions. Id. Public response to this omission encouraged further consideration
of the issue. Id. at 152. In 1957, Senator Neuberger once again introduced a bill
to control outdoor advertising signs. Id. This bill would have prohibited all
outdoor advertising within 750 feet of the Interstate System except directional and
other official signs, signs advertising the sale or lease of property on which they are
located, signs advertising activities conducted on the land on which they are
located, and signs on land zoned commercial or industrial. Id. at 154. Instead of
penalizing states for not complying with the legislation, the complying states would
be rewarded with a 0.75% increase in federal highway aid. Id. The Senate
Committee on Public Works took no action on the bill. Id. at 156.
45. Advertising was allowed if it involved directional and other official signs,
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provision that increased Federal-Aid highway funds by five percent
46
to complying states.
Critics of the Bonus Act believed that stronger, more effective
47
provisions should have been included. Others were concerned
that the Bonus Act would bribe states into passing legislation that
48
they might not otherwise pass in order to obtain federal funds.
During its seven-year existence, the Bonus Act improved only 195
49
miles of highway. By the time it expired on June 30, 1965, almost
50
$2 million in bonus money had been paid to fourteen states.
In 1965, President Johnson, who believed the Bonus Act to be
ineffective, called a White House Conference on Natural Beauty to
51
discuss, among other topics, outdoor advertising control. The day
signs advertising the sale or lease of property on which they were located, signs
advertising activities being conducted within twelve miles of the signs, and signs
designed to give information in the specific interest of people traveling on the
highway. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89, 95
(1958). While the bill was in the Senate, Senator Robert S. Kerr (D-Okla.),
attempted to amend it to strike provisions related to advertising control. Enfield,
supra note 44, at 160. This amendment was defeated by a vote of forty-one yeas to
forty-seven nays. Id. President Johnson, then a Senator and the Senate majority
leader, voted in favor of this amendment. Id.
46. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat. 89, 96
(1958).
47. See S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2396
(stating that the provisions of the bill were at the bare minimum that could be
done to help interested state governments to act). The Bonus Act was weakened
by a provision that excluded portions of the Interstate System constructed on
rights-of-way that were acquired on or before July 1, 1956, from outdoor
advertising control. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, 72 Stat.
89, 96 (1958). As a result of this amendment, only 65% of the Interstate System
could be regulated under the Bonus Act. Joseph C. Ingraham, Billboard Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1961 at XX1.
48. S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2400
(“The pattern is set here for the total destruction of the rights of the States by the
offering of Federal money to them to take action.”). The successor to the Bonus
Act, the Highway Beautification Act, served as a model for other federal statutes,
including the national 21-year-old legal drinking age and the 55-mile-per-hour
speed limit. Albert, supra note 37, at 494, n.135.
49. William D. Bruton, Billboard Legislation and the Takings Issue, GEO. U. L.
CTR. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. n.11 (2001), at http://www.scenicflorida.org/
bblegistakings.html#n11 (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). Only 40,000 miles of new
Interstate System roads were protected by the Bonus Act, amounting to less than
3% of the approximately 1,500,000 miles of surfaced public roads and highways.
S. REP. NO. 85-1407 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2367, 2396.
50. Enfield, supra note 44, at 167.
51. Id. at 168. President Johnson said, “The roads themselves must reflect, in
location and design, increased respect for the natural and social integrity and
unity of the landscape and communities through which they pass.” Albert, supra
note 37, at 476 (quoting Special Message to the Congress on Conservation and the
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after the conference, President Johnson sent a message to Congress
that recommended new legislation for outdoor advertising control,
soon to be known as the Highway Beautification Act of 1965
52
(“Beautification Act”). The Beautification Act was a product of
53
President Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. President Johnson
and the First Lady wanted to bring beauty to the nation’s highways
54
by controlling billboards and junkyards.
At the time, some
senators speculated that Lady Bird Johnson was the driving force
behind the bill, which President Johnson once suggested by stating
55
that he “must have it for Lady Bird.”
C. The Highway Beautification Act
Upon signing the Beautification Act on October 22, 1965,
President Johnson promised that as long as he was president, “what
has been divinely given by nature will not be recklessly taken away
56
He was not without opposition. Critics of the bill
by man.”

Restoration of Natural Beauty, 1 Pub. Papers 159 (Feb. 8, 1965)).
52. Enfield, supra note 44, at 168. In his letter to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House, President Johnson said that “by acting to bring
beauty to our roads, by making nature and recreation easily accessible, our
highway system can become immensely more valuable in serving the needs of the
American people . . . [a]nd those needs include the opportunity to touch nature
and see beauty.” H.R. REP. NO. 89-1084 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3710, 3711.
53. Timothy J. Fete, Jr., Comment, Illegal Billboards: Why the General Assembly
Should Revise the Outdoor Advertising Control Act to Comply with North Carolina Easement
Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2002). Other agendas included in the Great
Society program were “aid to education, attack on disease, Medicare, urban
renewal, . . . conservation, development of depressed regions, a wide-scale fight
against poverty, control and prevention of crime and delinquency, [and] removal
of obstacles to the right to vote.” The White House, Lyndon B. Johnson, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/lj36.html.
54. Albert, supra note 37, at 490.
55. Billboard Curbs Backed in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1965, at 23. The
Senate passed the bill (known as the Beauty Bill) on September 16, 1965, and the
House began debating on October 7, 1965. Federal Highway Administration, How
the Highway Beautification Act Became a Law, at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
infrastructure/beauty.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). Members of Congress and
their wives were invited to attend a Salute to Congress at the State Department and
a White House reception that same evening, and they hoped to bring the bill with
them as a gift to Lady Bird. Id. After hours of debates with their wives waiting, the
members of the House passed the Beauty Bill at one o’clock in the morning. Id.
Some legislators eventually made it to the White House for an early morning
celebration. Id.
56. John D. Pomfret, President Signs Scenic Road Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1965,
at 28.
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believed it was so weak that it did more harm than good.
Billboard opponents pointed to the billboard industry’s strong
Washington presence to explain the deficiencies of the anti58
billboard legislation. Others were critical of the White House for
pushing the bill through the legislature without full consideration
59
of all the issues and parties affected.
Opposition aside, the
Highway Beautification Act was enacted with the general purpose
of encouraging states to effectively control outdoor advertising and
thus to “protect the public investment in . . . highways, to promote
the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve
60
natural beauty.” The Beautification Act includes three programs:
outdoor advertising control, junkyard control, and landscaping and
61
scenic enhancement.
The Beautification Act controls all advertising within 660 feet
62
of the Interstate System and the primary highway system.
However, signs within 660 feet of a highway are allowed if they are
directional and official signs, signs that are determined to be
landmarks, or signs located on areas zoned industrial or

57. PBS, Lady Bird Johnson, Shattered Dreams, The Beautification Campaign, at
http://www.pbs.org/ladybird/shattereddreams/shattereddreams_report.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
58. Scenic America, Billboard Control, Fighting Visual Pollution, at http://
www.scenic.org/billboardsign/billboardcontrol.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Scenic America]. “[T]he outcome of the legislative process had more
to do with favoring the interests of the billboard industry than with really putting
effective control into place.” Albert, supra note 37, at 494 n.133. During the 198990 election cycle and the first six months of 1991, campaign contributions to
House Public Works Committee members totaled over $800,000. Scenic America,
supra. House Transportation Committee Chairman Bud Shuster (R-PA) received
over $65,000 in contributions from the billboard industry in the 1993-94 election
cycle. Id.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1084 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3736.
60. The Highway Beautification Act (“Beautification Act”), 23 U.S.C § 131(a)
(2000). Aesthetics were the main concern of the proponents of the Beautification
Act. Albert, supra note 37, at 479. The safety rationale was included to persuade
senators and congressmen who were not sold on the aesthetic rationale. Id. Safety
also provided a valid basis for states to exercise legislative power. Id. But see H.R.
REP. NO. 89-1084 at 3712 (stating that the outdoor advertising control act is “not in
any sense to be construed . . . for the use of police power”).
61. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, 1028-33 (1965) (codified as amended at
23 U.S.C. § 131 (2000)).
62. 23 U.S.C §§ 131(a)-(c) (2000). The distance of 660 feet was chosen
because anti-billboard proponents believed it would not be economically possible
to construct a billboard large enough to be seen from beyond 660 feet. Albert,
supra note 37, at 507. “Today billboards are larger than they were in 1965” and are
visible from more than 660 feet. Id.
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commercial under state law.
Signs are also allowed if they
specifically advertise the sale or lease of property upon which they
are located, activities conducted on the property on which they are
64
located, or free coffee by nonprofit organizations.
The
Beautification Act penalizes states that fail to comply with its
regulations by reducing their respective allocated federal highway
65
funds by ten percent.
D. The Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control Act
Minnesota amended its existing outdoor advertising control
legislation in 1971 to create the Minnesota Outdoor Advertising
66
Control Act (“The Minnesota Act”). The Minnesota Act attempts
63. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131(c)-(d) (2000).
64. Id. A 1965 House Report on the Highway Beautification Act expressed
concern over the inconsistencies between on-premises and off-premises signs:
“[T]he most offensive signs are those advertising activities conducted on the
property on which they are located. All of the Members of this body can visualize
the ugly appearance of signs, displays, and devices maintained upon the top side,
and around beer joints, filing stations, general stores, etc.” H.R. REP. NO. 89-1084
(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710, 3728. Another concern was that the
Beautification Act would hinder motorists from locating facilities in unfamiliar
areas. Id. at 3730. Furthermore, the elimination of signs other than “on premise”
signs and signs within commercial and industrial areas was feared to cause “the
bankruptcy of thousands of small businesses which are dependent upon the
patronage of highway users for their existence.” Id.
65. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (2000). As of the year 2000, “no state ha[d] been
penalized for noncompliance.” Albert, supra note 37, at 467. One of the main
differences between the Beautification Act and the former Bonus Act was the
manner in which states were induced to comply. The Bonus Act gave states that
complied a five percent increase in federal highway aid, while the Beautification
Act penalized non-complying states by reducing federal highway aid by ten
percent. Compare Pub. L. No. 85-381 (1958), 72 Stat. 89, 96 (1958) with 23 U.S.C. §
131(b) (2000). At first, President Johnson proposed to cut 100% of federal
highway aid to states that did not establish effective control of billboards by
January 1, 1968. Eric Wentworth, President’s Plan to Combat Highway Blight Draws
Support of Billboard Owners’ Group, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1954, at 8. Under this
version, if none of the states complied, the lost aid would have amounted to $3.8
billion per year in 1965. Id. This penalty was too large for many legislators and
was subsequently changed to a ten percent reduction in federal highway aid.
Another difference between the Beautification Act and the Bonus Act was the
amount of area affected. The Beautification Act applied to the entire 41,000 miles
of the Interstate System and 228,000 miles of the primary system, while the Bonus
Act applied only to those portions of the Interstate System built on land acquired
after 1956. Enfield, supra note 44, at 174.
66. The Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 173.01.27 (2002). The original legislation, designed to comply with the Bonus Act, was
enacted in 1965 before President Johnson’s Beautification Act. 1965 Minn. Laws
ch. 827. “If you are going to have control you may as well comply with federal
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to effectively and reasonably control the erection of advertising
devices near highways to conserve the “natural beauty” of the
67
surrounding land. The language of the Minnesota Act recognizes
not only natural beauty but also the commercial importance of
68
outdoor advertising. Like the Beautification Act, the Minnesota
Act allows outdoor advertising where “business and commercial
69
activities are conducted.” “Business areas” are those areas zoned
for business, industrial, or commercial activities; these areas
collectively create the business area exception to Minnesota’s
regulations so that we can receive a bonus to help defray the costs.” Senator
Knudson, Minutes from the Senate Subcommittee on Billboards, Mar. 17, 1965
(on file with the Minnesota Historical Society). Norman Larson, Chairman of the
Public Highways Committee, summarized the legislation in a report to the
Minnesota Senate.
[The bill] controls advertising along the interstate highway system and
provides for scenic areas where billboard advertising will be at a
minimum. In scenic areas established, the control will be, wherever
practicable, as stringent as the federal law and federal rules and
regulations require in order that the state may receive federal
participation in the cost of acquisition of the necessary easements.
Outside of the scenic areas established, the advertising along the highway
will be controlled to a point where only approximately four advertising
devices on each side of the highway will be allowed. Certain advertising
that would interfere with safety would be eliminated immediately. Other
advertising in place at the effective date of passage of the bill would be
allowed to remain in place until 1969, at which time they will be removed
to the extent necessary so that the spacing requirements set forth in the
bill will be effective.
Letter from Norman Larson, Chairman of Public Highway Committee, to the
senators of the 89th Congress 8 (May 21, 1965) (on file with the Minnesota
Historical Society) (summarizing the bills enacted during 89th legislature that
affected highways).
67. MINN. STAT. § 173.01 (2002).
68. “[O]utdoor advertising is an integral part of the business and marketing
function, an established segment of the national economy, and a legitimate
commercial use of property . . . it should be allowed to operate where other
business and commercial activities are conducted.” Id. Outdoor advertising
control legislation in many, but not all, states includes similar language. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 23-1-272 (1975) (“The Legislature hereby finds and declares that
outdoor advertising is a legitimate use of private property adjacent to roads and
highways.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-70 (2001) (“The General Assembly recognizes
that the outdoor advertising industry is a bona fide commercial function.”); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 68-2231 (2002) (“[O]utdoor advertising is a legitimate, commercial
use of private property.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 226.500 (2004) (“The general
assembly finds and declares that outdoor advertising is a legitimate commercial
use of private property adjacent to the interstate and primary highway systems.”);
NEV. REV. STAT. 410.220 (2002) (“The erection and maintenance of outdoor
advertising signs . . . is a legitimate commercial use of private property.”).
69. MINN. STAT. § 173.01 (2002).
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prohibition on outdoor advertising. The business area exception
of the Minnesota Act was not litigated in Minnesota until the Eller
71
Media dispute arose.
Its application, however, was to be in
72
compliance with the Highway Beautification Act and all applicable
73
federal regulations.
III. THE ELLER MEDIA DECISION
A. Backdrop to the Eller Media Decision
In 1995, the City of Mounds View opened The Bridges, a
municipally owned golf course that was originally financed by a
74
revenue bond. The land on which the golf course was built was a
combination of two zoning districts: an Industrial district and a
75
Conservancy, Recreation, and Preservation (“CRP”) district. The
golf course was profitable but unable to pay its full debt payments
70. A business area is “any part of an adjacent area which is (a) zoned for
business, industrial or commercial activities under the authority of any law of this
state or any political subdivision thereof; or (b) not so zoned, but which
constitutes an unzoned commercial or industrial area as herein defined.” Id. §
173.02, subd. 17. Other exceptions include directional and other official signs,
signs advertising the sale of the property on which the sign is located, signs
advertising activities conducted on the property on which the sign is located, signs
stating the name and address of the owner of the property, public utility signs,
service club and religious notices, signs which are not visible from the adjacent
road, and community identification signs. Id. § 173.08, subd. 1.
71. In Minnesota, the Beautification Act has been the subject of only a few
cases. See, e.g., State v. Hopf, 323 N.W.2d 746, 755 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a
provision of the Minnesota Act that prohibits signs near schools and churches but
permits signs in business areas was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments); State v. Lutsen Resorts, Inc., 310 N.W.2d 495, 496-97 (Minn. 1981)
(holding that condemnation of signs pursuant to the Minnesota Act did not deny
sign owners equal protection, despite the state's continued maintenance of its
own signs); State v. Weber-Connelly, Naegele, Inc. 448 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that condemnation under the Minnesota Act requires
compensation for lost income).
72. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (2000).
73. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.701-713 (2004).
74. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003).
75. Id. In 1988, the State of Minnesota quitclaimed CRP-zoned land, which
was later developed into the golf course, to the city. Id. “The deed contained a
provision that the property would revert back to the state if it was not used for a
public purpose.” Id. The other portion of the golf course was acquired from
Sysco Foods in 1989, which was rezoned from Industrial to Public Facilities. In re
Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device Permits in the
City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), rev’d, 604
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003).
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76

in both 1998 and 1999. After supplementing golf course revenue
with money from the city’s general fund, the Mounds View City
Council contemplated utilizing revenue-generating billboards that
would be visible to cars on the highways that border the golf
77
course. Zoning ordinances, however, rendered the proposition
difficult.
At the time, Mounds View’s comprehensive zoning plan did
78
not allow billboards in any zoning district. The city council thus
adopted three ordinances during the fall of 1999 and the spring of
2000 to amend the Mounds View City Zoning Code to permit
79
billboards within CRP, Public Facilities (“PF”), and Planned Unit
80
Development (“PUD”) districts.
Additionally, a limited-use
district was created on The Bridges Golf Course property along
81
The
Highway 10 where the billboards were to be allowed.
planning commission unanimously voted to recommend that the
city deny the proposed ordinance, but the city ignored this
recommendation and approved the ordinance with an automatic
termination provision to satisfy concerns that the billboards would
82
remain after the need for the revenue ended. Ordinance 655 was
thus introduced at a March 2000 city council meeting, when the
entire city-owned golf course was rezoned to a PF district because
76. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 3.
77. Id. The city hoped these signs would generate enough revenue to enable
the golf course to make its payments without assistance from the city’s general
funds. Id.
78. Id.
79. In 1984, the city rezoned the large majority of all city-owned property into
“Public Facilities” (“PF”) districts. Id. This designation limited use of the land to
public buildings, public uses, public parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, parking
areas, golf courses, public sewers, water lines, water storage areas, public streets,
easements, public ways, highways, thoroughfares, treatment and pumping
facilities, and other public utility and public service facilities. MOUNDS VIEW,
MINN., ZONING CODE § 1118.02 “2000), available at http://www.ci.moundsview.mn.us/docs/ZONING2.pdf.
80. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d at 4-5. The city attorney recommended the
inclusion of PUD districts in this ordinance to avoid spot zoning concerns. Id. at
5.
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id.
The planning commission provided four reasons for its
recommendation. First, the CRP and PF districts are “intended to provide
recreational opportunities, open space and protect the natural environment
where possible,” thus billboards “are more appropriate to commercial and
industrial zoning districts.” Id. Second, billboards “can be visually distractive.” Id.
Third, “the city cannot limit billboards to city-owned properties only.” Id. Fourth,
“[s]tate statutes restrict [billboards] to commercial and industrial zoning districts”
and the proposed sites were not so zoned. Id. at 4-5.
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its former zoning classifications, CRP and Industrial, were deemed
83
inconsistent with the city’s comprehensive plan.
In May 2000, Eller Media, an outdoor advertising company,
applied for six permits with the Minnesota Department of
Transportation (“MNDOT”) to construct billboards on the golf
84
course.
MNDOT denied the permits on the ground that the
proposed location did not comply with the Minnesota Outdoor
85
Eller Media challenged this denial
Advertising Control Act.
before an administrative law judge, and the city intervened in the
86
proceeding.
The administrative law judge recommended that the permits
be issued, and a subsequent report was submitted to the
87
Commissioner of MNDOT. The Commissioner, however, denied
the permits on three grounds: Mounds View’s actions amounted to
88
spot zoning and violated 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b); the commercial
use of the golf course was merely incidental and violated 23 C.F.R.
89
§ 750.708(d); and the golf course was not a “business area” under
90
the Minnesota Act. The City of Mounds View appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the Commissioner
91
and directed MNDOT to issue the permits. The court of appeals
found that the golf course was a “business area” under the
Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control Act on the basis that
Minnesota’s Act focuses on the use of the land rather than the
92
zoning label.
The court reasoned that not only was the golf
course engaged in “business activity,” but the PF zone specifically
listed “golf courses,” which are engaged in business activity, and
83. Id. at 5-6.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See infra Part IV.B.1.
89. See infra Part IV.B.2.
90. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 6.
91. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d 492, 504 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002),
rev’d, 604 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003).
92. Id. at 499-500. “The commissioner’s deputy’s interpretation that ‘business
area’ does not include municipal owned land adds something to the statute that
the legislature did not impose. This goes beyond interpretation of the statute and
represents its will not its judgment and is thus arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 501.
The court of appeals also noted that MNDOT had previously granted permits for
billboards on government-owned land in another municipality’s PF district. Id. at
497.
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93

thus rendered the property “zoned for business.”
The court further held that in applying the necessary federal
regulations, the golf course was not an “incidental use” of the land
because the golf course business was the sole activity conducted on
94
the land.
The city’s actions similarly did not constitute spot
95
zoning, which the federal regulations expressly prohibit.
The
court of appeals reasoned that Mounds View operated under a
comprehensive zoning plan and therefore the fact that the action
96
was created to permit outdoor advertising was not determinative.
97
MNDOT petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review.
B. The Decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court
Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court employed a
98
substantial evidence test, giving deference to the Commissioner of
MNDOT, but reserved the right “to review de novo errors of law
which arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of
99
words in a statute.”
93. Id. at 500.
94. Id. The court applied 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(d) which specifies that zones
“in which limited commercial or industrial activities are permitted as an incident
to other primary land uses [are] not considered to be a commercial or industrial
zone for outdoor advertising control purposes.” Id.
95. Id. at 501-02. The regulation states that the outdoor advertising
exception will not be permitted if the action was not part of the comprehensive
plan and the action occurred primarily to permit outdoor advertising structures.
23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (2004) (emphasis added). The city rezoned the golf course
to a PF district to bring it into consistency with the comprehensive plan. In re
Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device Permits in the
City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d at 501-02.
The FHWA refuted this
interpretation, stating that a zoning action, although consistent with the
comprehensive plan, violates the Beautification Act if the underlying purpose is to
permit billboards. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION, Legal Opinion on the FHWA's Interpretation of 23 CFR § 750.708(b),
Acceptance of State Zoning for Purposes of the Highway Beautification Act,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/zoningop.htm (last modified May 4, 2004)
(legal opinion requested by the State of Minnesota in connection with the Eller
Media case) [hereinafter Legal Opinion].
96. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d at 501.
97. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003).
98. Id. at 7. In reviewing an agency decision, Minnesota courts are to exercise
judicial restraint, “lest [they] substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency.”
Id. They will not disturb an agency’s decision “as long as the agency’s
determination has adequate support in the record as required by the substantial
evidence test.” Id.
99. Id. at 6-7.
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The court first rejected Eller Media’s and Mounds View’s
argument that the industrial characteristics of the surrounding
100
areas were significant. The court found that because these areas
were not located in the City of Mounds View, their zoning
101
Eller Media and Mounds View also
designations were irrelevant.
argued that activities such as a water treatment plant, a city office
complex, a water tower, and a golf course are conducted in PF
districts, so PF districts are zoned for commercial or business
102
activities under the Minnesota Act.
The court similarly rejected
this argument, holding that a use permitted in both PF and
business districts does not make the PF district “most appropriate”
103
for commerce.
The court applied the Minnesota Outdoor Advertising Control
Act, the Highway Beautification Act, and the City of Mounds View’s
104
comprehensive plan to reverse the court of appeals.
The
Minnesota Act mandates compliance with federal law; thus the
majority opinion held that the use of a PF-zoned golf course must
also comply with the Beautification Act’s definition of commercial
105
or industrial use.
The majority, relying on the Commissioner of
MNDOT’s findings, found that the PF district was not the “most
appropriate” use for commerce, industry, or trade because other
districts existed in Mounds View that the city’s comprehensive plan
106
had zoned specifically for business and industrial purposes. “The
overriding purpose of land use in Mounds View’s PF districts is the
public character of the land use and dedication to public needs
and access . . . [thus] Mounds View intended to make [its PF]
107
district distinct from its business district.”
The court reasoned
that if the city believed that the golf course was appropriate for
commerce, industry, or trade, it would have designated it as a
108
business area. The court concluded that the golf course was not
“zoned for business, industrial, or commercial activities” and
therefore was not a “business area” as required by the Minnesota

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 7, 10.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
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109

Outdoor Advertising Control Act.
In dissent, Justice Hanson took another approach to applying
the control acts by liberally interpreting the Highway Beautification
Act not as a mechanism to control outdoor advertising, but as a
mechanism to provide incentives to states to implement laws that
110
effectively control advertising devices.
Unlike the majority,
Justice Hanson did not defer to the Commissioner of MNDOT’s
111
decision because the underlying facts were not in dispute.
Instead, he concluded that the critical issue, whether or not a
municipal golf course qualifies as a “business area” or a district
“most appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade,” was a
112
question of law.
Justice Hanson determined that the Minnesota
Act effectively controls outdoor advertising devices and that the
only question to be determined was whether the language of the
113
statute permits such signs on a PF-zoned public golf course.
Focusing on the use of the property and not on ownership or
labels, Justice Hanson reasoned that the zoning actions of the city
were an effort to comply with the comprehensive plan and,
114
therefore, no spot zoning had occurred.
Most importantly, the
dissent concluded that The Bridges Golf Course, despite being
publicly owned, was operated as a business and that these activities
115
effectively made the golf course a business area.

109. Id. The court reasoned that the local government should zone an area
for commerce to provide for such activities. Id. According to the court,
commercial activities that are permitted in a non-commercial zone do not render
the zone commercial. Id. at 9. The court rejected Eller Media’s and Mounds
View’s contention that the properties surrounding the golf course were zoned
industrial, warehouse, or office park, and, therefore, the PF district is zoned for
business or commercial activities under the definition in the Minnesota Act. Id. It
held that surrounding areas do not dictate the zoning category of adjacent
property, especially when those areas are located in different municipalities. Id.
“To conclude otherwise would eviscerate the very power given to municipal
officials to govern within their jurisdiction and could create a domino effect with
one governing body’s decisions affecting the zoning decisions in neighboring
communities.” Id.
110. Id. at 12 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 11.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 14. Justice Hanson reasoned that the use of the property was not
incidental because the golf course was the primary use of the zoned land. Id. at
14-15.
115. Id. The city’s PF designation was based on ownership, not on use. The
outdoor control acts “are indifferent to ownership . . . [and rely] on the activities
conducted on the property.” Id. at 15.
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IV. ANALYSIS
As a matter of first impression, the Minnesota Supreme Court
interpreted the business area exception to the Minnesota Outdoor
Advertising Control Act in conjunction with the Federal Highway
116
Beautification Act.
The court faced the difficult task of
reconciling these laws with the City of Mounds View’s
117
comprehensive zoning plan. Analysis of the court’s decision must
begin with the regulations that have been promulgated by the
Federal Highway Administration because the Minnesota Act is to be
construed in light of the policies behind the Highway
118
Beautification Act.
A. The Minnesota Act in Light of the Highway Beautification Act
In 1975, the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”)
promulgated policies and regulations to implement the
119
Beautification Act. The stated purpose of these regulations is “to
assure that there is effective State control of outdoor advertising in
120
areas adjacent to Interstate and Federal-aid primary highways.”
The FHWA regulations define “commercial” and “industrial” zones
as those districts that states determine are “most appropriate for
121
commerce, industry, or trade, regardless of how labeled.”
The
language suggests that the use of the land, not the zoning label, is
122
important for Beautification Act purposes.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that Minnesota’s
123
definition of a “business area” must be interpreted in light of the
124
The
Beautification Act, which it was enacted to implement.
Beautification Act defines commercial and industrial zones as
“those districts established by the zoning authorities as being most
appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade, regardless of how
125
labeled.”
Instead of focusing on the “regardless of how labeled”
116. Id. at 7.
117. See id.
118. MINN. STAT. § 173.185 (2002).
119. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 750.701-.713 (2004).
120. Id. § 750.701 (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 750.703(a) (emphasis added).
122. See id.
123. A business area is “any part of an adjacent area which is zoned for
business, industrial, or commercial activities.” MINN. STAT. § 173.02, subd. 17
(2002).
124. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003).
125. 23 C.F.R. § 750.703(a) (emphasis added).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 10
STENSLAND (CB & CKI & LSK)

650

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/14/2004 5:50:28 PM

[Vol. 31:2

language, the majority emphasized the “most appropriate”
language, stating that the commercial use must be so prevalent that
the City of Mounds View would have labeled it as a commercial or
126
industrial zone.
The court determined that the Mounds View
comprehensive plan created both PF and business districts in order
127
to distinguish between public and commercial purposes.
The
court thus concluded that the city specifically intended PF districts
to be separate from those districts designated for commercial,
128
industrial, or business activities.
In reality, Mounds View’s comprehensive plan distinguished
PF districts based on ownership; land actually used for any use was
129
zoned PF because it was owned by the city. Therefore, the Public
Facilities (“PF”) designation is most appropriate for any city-owned
130
land, including land on which commercial activities take place.
As such, the majority should have reasonably interpreted the
comprehensive plan as naming several districts as most appropriate
for business and commercial activities: business districts, industrial
districts, and PF districts.
B. Controlling Abuse of the Highway Beautification Act
Because the Beautification Act gave states the power to zone
areas as commercial or industrial, legislators naturally feared that
municipalities would zone land as such for the sole purpose of
circumventing the Beautification Act, abusing the allowance of
131
billboards in these zones.
The FHWA, therefore, promulgated
126. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d at 10.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. “[A]ll city owned property is ‘supposed’ to be zoned PF, according to the
City Code.”
JAMES ERICSON, CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW STAFF REPORT, at
http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/PF-report.pdf (relaying the results of the
“Public Hearing to Consider the Introduction and First Reading of Ordinance
720, an Ordinance Rezoning all Parcels Currently Zoned PF, Public Facilities”).
130. See MOUNDS VIEW, MINN., ZONING CODE §§ 1118.01-.02 (1997) (PF, the
Public Facilities District), http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/docs/ZONING2.pdf.
131. Legal Opinion, supra note 95. “Some witnesses . . . speculated that the
States, if left to themselves in this matter, would engage in ‘strip zoning’ and thus
zone large stretches of highways as industrial solely for the purpose of outdoor
advertising.” Id. During final discussions of the HBA in 1965, Senator Jennings
Randolph explained the extent of a state’s zoning powers in light of the
commercial exception. Id. “This language, of course, does not mean that a state
or local authority could place a label ‘zoned commercial or industrial’ on land
adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems solely to permit billboards or
junkyards and thereby frustrate the intent of Congress.” Id.
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regulations specifically to differentiate between legitimate,
comprehensive zoning versus actions that are not true zoning;
legitimate commercial and industrial zones versus limited purpose
areas created primarily to allow outdoor advertising; and legitimate
zoning actions versus actions that appear to be part of
comprehensive zoning but are actually schemes to allow outdoor
132
advertising. Two provisions of the FHWA’s regulations, discussed
133
below, are specifically aimed to prevent sham or phony zoning.
In rejecting Mounds View’s applications for billboard permits,
the Commissioner of MNDOT held that the city’s zoning actions
134
violated these regulations.
Both the dissent and the court of
135
appeals disagreed.
The supreme court did not specifically
consider these rules because once it found that the PF zone was not
“most appropriate for commerce, industry, or trade,” the issue of
136
sham or phony zoning was irrelevant.
Upon examination of the
Eller Media situation, it is apparent that the City of Mounds View’s
zoning actions were legitimate and that an inquiry into the actual
use of the land was, and is, imperative.
1. The Mounds View Comprehensive Plan and C.F.R. Section
750.708(b)
The first FHWA regulation, section 750.708(b), addresses spot
zoning concerns and states that zoning which is not part of a
comprehensive plan, but is conducted primarily to allow outdoor
advertising, will not qualify as a commercial or industrial zone
137
under the Beautification Act.
The FHWA issued a report that
132. See Legal Opinion, supra note 95. The FHWA looks at a variety of factors,
beyond a zone’s label, to determine if the underlying purpose of a zoning action is
to circumvent the Beautification Act. Id. These factors include the expressed
reasons for the zoning change, the zoning for the surrounding area, the actual
land uses nearby, the existence of plans for commercial or industrial development,
the availability of utilities in the newly zoned area, and the existence of access to
roads or dedicated access to the newly zoned area. Id. A combination of the
above factors determines whether the FHWA will consider the zoning action as
legitimate under the Beautification Act. Id.
133. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (discussed infra Part IV.B.1.); 23 C.F.R. §
750.708(d) (discussed infra Part IV.B.2).
134. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2003).
135. Id. at 10 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (2004). Litigation over this regulation has
occurred in several states. See, e.g., Files v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t,
925 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Ark. 1996) (holding that a commercial zoning designation
was given for the purpose of constructing billboards based on evidence that
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expanded the scope of the regulation after the State of Minnesota
138
requested an opinion on the correct interpretation of the rule.
According to the FHWA, “[a]ctions that are facially part of
comprehensive zoning, but in fact are merely schemes to allow
outdoor advertising in rural or residential areas, are not accepted
by the FHWA as valid zoning for purposes of control of outdoor
139
advertising.”
Section 750.708(b) mandates that a zoning action
be a legitimate exercise of zoning powers in accordance with the
municipality’s planning goals, instead of sham zoning for the
140
primary purpose of permitting outdoor advertising.
Furthermore, the report states that despite an area being
comprehensively zoned, if pockets of land are zoned as commercial
or industrial based solely on the commercial or industrial nature of
141
outdoor advertising, the result is spot zoning.
Such a result
142
would violate the Beautification Act.
Section 750.708(b)
therefore aims to prevent spot zoning by restricting billboards to
143
The intent
legitimately zoned commercial and industrial areas.
behind this regulation is to prevent municipalities from hiding
behind a comprehensive plan when zoned areas are not truly
adjacent commercially zoned land with billboards was being used only for
agricultural purposes and that the plaintiff, a known billboard entrepreneur,
admitted that he had no plans to develop the land at issue); Lamar Outdoor
Adver. Inc. v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 133 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that the zoning action was taken to permit the construction
of billboards); United Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Bus., Transp., Hous. Agency, 746
P.2d 877, 882 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the area was zoned for the sole purpose of
constructing billboards, and thus violated the Beautification Act); Redpath v. Mo.
Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 14 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
23 C.F.R. § 750.708 (b) requires a determination of why a particular area was
zoned commercial or industrial); Penn Adver. Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 608 A.2d
1115, 1116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that even though an area was zoned
commercial, it violated the Beautification Act because the city had illegally spot
zoned the area).
138. Legal Opinion, supra note 95. This report was issued after both the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court issued decisions
on the situation at hand. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. South Dakota comprehensively zoned all areas along Interstate and
Federal-aid primary systems as commercial or industrial when most of the
surrounding areas were used for agricultural purposes. South Dakota v. Volpe,
353 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.S.D. 1973) (holding that although the land was
comprehensively zoned, the strip zoning violated the purpose of the Beautification
Act and thus billboards were not permitted).
143. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(b) (2004).
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commercial or industrial. This regulation demands a close look at
the use of the land to determine if the land is actually used for
144
commercial or industrial purposes.
In this case, Mounds View acted pursuant to its comprehensive
plan to correctly rezone the golf course, a city-owned property, as a
PF district. In addition, the commercial nature of the PF zone does
not arise solely from the commercial nature of billboard activities.
Despite being publicly owned, The Bridges Golf Course is a
145
commercial use of land.
Mounds View’s actions are not in
violation of section 750.708(b).
2.

Incidental Use and C.F.R. Section 750.708(d)

The second FHWA regulation, section 750.708(d), states that
areas on which “commercial or industrial activities are permitted as
an incident to other primary land uses are not considered to be . . .
146
commercial or industrial” zones under the Beautification Act.
A
Wisconsin court has interpreted this regulation to determine if a
147
conditional use is incidental to primary use.
The court found
that a conditional use that is expressly permitted by an ordinance is
not inconsistent with other uses in the zone and therefore is not
148
subordinate to primary use.
The use is itself a primary use and
149
A use that is
can be considered for Beautification Act purposes.
specifically permitted is neither subordinate nor automatically
150
deemed “incidental.”
Ascertaining the actual use of the land is essential to a correct
determination of whether a commercial or industrial use is
144. See Volpe, 353 F. Supp. at 340.
145. The course generates revenue from green fees, lessons, merchandise, and
food. Eller Media, 664 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2003) (Hanson, J., dissenting). The
city residents do not receive any discount, and in fact, golfers pay some of the
highest green fees in the area for a round at The Bridges. Id. Green and range
fees at The Bridges for the 2004 season are $15 for nine holes of golf and $10 for a
jumbo bucket of balls.
The Bridges Golf Course, Rates, http://www.
bridgesgolf.com/rates.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
146. 23 C.F.R. § 750.708(d) (2004). Something is incidental if it has a minor
role or is “subordinate to something of greater importance.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 777 (8th ed. 2004).
147. Wis. Dep’t of Transp. v. Office of Comm’r of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 15
(Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
148. Id. at 16-17; see also Alper v. State, 621 P.2d 492, 495 (Nev. 1980) (holding
that the actual and contemplated uses of the zoned land should be examined
instead of just the zoning label).
149. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 400 N.W.2d at 16-17.
150. Id.
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151

incidental. The Minnesota Court of Appeals correctly did so and
opined that because the golf course is not only expressly permitted
in a PF-zone but is also the sole activity conducted on the land, it
152
cannot constitute an incidental use.
The golf course, a business
area, is actually located on the area where the billboards are to be
constructed. In no way can it be reasoned that the commercial
nature of the revenue-generating public golf course is incidental to
the revenue potentially generated by billboard advertising.
C. The Crucial Step: What is the Actual Use?
As discussed above, the FHWA regulations mandate an
examination of the actual use of the land. The majority opinion,
however, overlooked this step and construed the definition of
“business area” from the Minnesota Act to mean that the label of
153
the district must be commercial, industrial, or business.
The
court would have been wise to look beyond the name of the zone to
the actual use of the land and the reasons behind the zoning
154
ordinances. Granted, if the land in question had been zoned for
commercial or industrial activities and no actual development was
planned or contemplated for the near future, the area should be
155
restricted by the Beautification Act.
However, if an area such as
151. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that this regulation demands an
examination beyond the zoning label to the actual use of the area. Alper, 621 P.2d
at 495. Cf. Drayton v. Dep’t of Transp., 62 P.3d 430, 434 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(reversing the Department of Transportation’s finding that “[i]n short . . . the
land at the location of the sign is at most an incidental storage facility, in place as
an attempt to qualify the land for signing purposes”).
152. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d 492, 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002),
rev’d 664 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003). But see Drayton, 62 P.3d at 434 (holding that the
use of the land in question was as a storage facility, incidental to the main business
located in another location and constructed for the sole purpose of allowing
billboards).
153. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.’s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device
Permits in the City of Mounds View, 642 N.W.2d at 500. “The city has recognized
a difference between areas zoned for business and areas zoned for public purposes
. . . and clearly knew how to zone for business, commercial, and industrial areas
and ha[s] specifically done so in its comprehensive plan.” Id.
154. As did the dissent. Eller Media , 664 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2003) (Hanson,
J., dissenting) see also Files v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 925 S.W.2d 404,
408-09 (Ark. 1996) (holding that the department should look behind zoning
labels to the purposes of the zoning ordinances); Alper, 621 P.2d at 495 (holding
that a “determination should [be] made as to the status of the area on which each
billboard is located”).
155. See Alper, 621 P.2d at 495.
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The Bridges is zoned and actually used or contemplated for
156
commercial purposes, then billboards ought to be permitted. By
overlooking this crucial step, the court misapplied the Minnesota
Outdoor Advertising Control Act in light of the regulations that
have been promulgated by the FHWA. But what about the public
policy concerns that originally sparked enactment of outdoor
advertising control legislation?
D. Theory versus Fact: The Policies Behind Outdoor Advertising Control
The result of the Eller Media decision does theoretically comply
with the overall hope of President Johnson to “protect the public
investment in . . . highways, to promote the safety and recreational
157
value of public travel, and to preserve natural beauty.”
It is
plausible that the Beautification Act permitted billboards in
commercial and industrial areas because they are not as
158
aesthetically pleasing or worthy of protection as other areas. The
Bridges’ situation is unique, however, because although the area is
used for a legitimate commercial or industrial purpose, a golf
course is inherently a beautiful, green space, and the view from the
adjacent highway could be marred if billboards were constructed.
Although the Eller Media decision may have preserved the
natural beauty of the golf course, the decision disregarded the fact
that the Beautification Act, the Minnesota Act, and the FHWA
regulations are meant to allow states to utilize outdoor advertising
in those areas legitimately used for commercial or industrial
159
purposes. The Beautification Act seeks to balance the conflicting
interests of commerce and conservationists. Municipalities that
properly follow the mechanics of these laws should be permitted to
construct billboards as the laws expressly permit. Furthermore,
Minnesota has effectively controlled outdoor advertising by
enacting the Minnesota Act and allowing billboards only in
160
“business areas.”
The Bridges Golf Course, although zoned for
156. See id.
157. The Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C § 131(a) (2000).
158. “There is no extensive discussion of the rationale for the
industrial/commercial exception in the hearings or in the congressional debates,”
but one possible rationale is that “industrial and commercial areas are not
inherently attractive and hence are not worthy of beautification protection.”
Albert, supra note 37, at 508.
159. See 23 U.S.C § 131(a); MINN. STAT. §§ 173.01-.27 (2002); 23 C.F.R. §
750.701 (2004).
160. See MINN. STAT. § 173.01.
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“Public Facilities,” is just such a business area. By not permitting
the use of billboards in a legitimate business area, the Eller Media
decision tipped the balance in favor of conservationists and
ignored legitimate commercial interests.
V. CONCLUSION: THE BRIDGES IN 2004
John C. Kluczynski, chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Roads, said in reference to the Beautification Act, “I believe we
161
have enacted a can of worms.”
The veracity of his statement
certainly is exemplified by the Eller Media case. The Minnesota
Supreme Court struggled to untangle the outdoor advertising
control acts and regulations. As a result, the City of Mounds View
was forced to jump through hoop after hoop to achieve the result
to which it was legally entitled.
On October 13, 2003, the Mounds View City Council approved
and adopted two ordinances to rezone the PF areas into
designations consistent with the actual use of the land instead of
162
ownership. On July 8, 2004, after a four-year battle with MNDOT
and the Minnesota court system, having spent over a million dollars
in internal loans to the golf course, the City of Mounds View
received approval from MNDOT to erect billboards on The Bridges
163
Golf Course. Despite the additional revenue from the billboards,
the golf course was still unable to meet its debt payments by
164
$40,000 to $50,000.
161. Enfield, supra note 44, at 150.
162. MOUNDS VIEW, MINN., CITY ORDINANCES §§ 720-721 (Oct. 13, 2003),
available at http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/ords.htm. The Bridges is now
designated as “Light Industrial” (LI). Id. The city added its name to the golf
course to assure residents that it was still tied to the city. Allen Powell II, All
Options on Table for Mounds View Golf Course, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 22, 2004,
at 6B. Other uses permitted in PF districts were also rezoned. City parks and city
wells are now zoned “Residential” (R-1). JAMES ERICSON, CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW
STAFF REPORT, at http://www.ci.mounds-view.mn.us/PF-report.pdf (last viewed
July 11, 2004). City hall and the community center are now zoned “Highway
Business Commercial” (B-3). Id. Golf courses, public works garages, and water
towers are now zoned “Industrial” (I-1). Id.
163. Allen Powell II, Golf Course Billboards OK’d, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 9,
2004, at B3. Clear Channel Outdoors plans on constructing six billboards, which
will be forty-five feet tall, along U.S. Highway 10 on the golf course property for
about $250,000 per year. Id.
164. Id. The city is considering redeveloping portions of the golf course to
raise additional revenue. Id. In October 2004, after signing a lease with Clear
Channel, the city asked that the billboard construction be postponed until at least
March 2005 because an unidentified company had expressed an interest in
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The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of Minnesota’s
business area exception to the outdoor advertising control acts
resulted in an extremely inefficient outcome because the decision
focused on the zoning label instead of the actual use of the land. If
the majority had employed a reasonable interpretation of
Minnesota’s Outdoor Advertising Control Act, instead of an unduly
strict interpretation, the City of Mounds View could have
maintained effective control over outdoor advertising by employing
the legislatively recognized economic power of billboards to resolve
its budget issue.

erecting an office building on the property. Allen Powell II, Mounds View
Municipal Golf Course, City Wants Billboard Construction Postponed, Lease Clashing with
Development Plans, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 7, 2004, at B4. In 1988, the State of
Minnesota quitclaimed fifty-five acres of the golf course with a reverter clause that
requires the city to use the property for a public purpose or the state will retake
control. Allen Powell II, Golf Course Review Pondered, Environmental Survey,
Development Possible, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 12, 2004, at B1. The city must
now determine whether an office building constitutes a public purpose, and if not,
whether legislative action could void the reverter clause. Id.
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